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Abstract—Because energy storage systems have better ramping
characteristics than traditional generators, their participation in
frequency regulation should facilitate the balancing of load and
generation. However, they cannot sustain their output indefinitely.
System operators have therefore implemented new frequency
regulation policies to take advantage of the fast ramps that
energy storage systems can deliver while alleviating the prob-
lems associated with their limited energy capacity. This paper
contrasts several U.S. policies that directly affect the participation
of energy storage systems in frequency regulation and compares
the revenues that the owners of such systems might achieve under
each policy.
Index Terms—Energy storage, Power system economics, Power
system frequency control
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequency regulation service involves the injection or
withdrawal of active power from the power grid to maintain
the system frequency [1]. In the United States, frequency
regulation is equivalent to secondary frequency control, while
primary frequency control is more commonly known as fre-
quency response. The most common mean for a unit to
provide frequency regulation is following a system operator’s
automatic generation control (AGC) signal, which computes
the area control error (ACE) from frequency deviations and
interchange power imbalances.
An appropriate response to the AGC signal requires dis-
patching flexibility within the assigned regulation capacity.
Traditionally, the majority of frequency regulation capability
has been provided by specially equipped generators. As tech-
nologies evolve, new types of flexibility resources emerge,
such as battery and flywheel energy storage. These energy
storage systems have significantly faster ramping capabilities
compared to conventional generators, and their participation in
frequency regulation can reduce the need to procure regulation
capacity [2]. To create an incentive for fast responding units to
participate in frequency regulation, the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) enacted FERC Order 755 [3], which
requires system operators to add a performance payment with
an accuracy adjustment to the capacity payment typically used
in markets for ancillary services. This “pay-for-performance”
scheme has been implemented by most U.S. independent sys-
tem operators (ISO) and regional transmission organizations
(RTO). Under this new market rule, fast ramping regulation
resources receive higher regulation payments because their
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performance is usually more accurate. A case study conducted
by RES Americas has already shown that its 4 MW / 2.6 MWh
battery storage achieved a very high performance in following
the regulation signal provided by PJM [4].
To further utilize the fast responsive capability of energy
storage systems (ESS) beyond the traditional AGC framework,
some system operators, such as PJM, have introduced fast
regulation. Units participating in fast regulation follow a
regulation signal that changes much faster than the traditional
AGC signal, and receive extra payments for doing so. The
system operator also benefits from the improved regulation
accuracy. A review by the California Energy Storage Alliance
(CESA) shows that the combination of pay-for-performance
and fast regulation has reduced the procurement requirement
in the PJM regulation market by 30% [5].
However, the high investment cost of ESS has so far limited
the installed energy storage capacity [6]. The energy lost
during charging and discharging and the energy imbalance in
the regulation signal make it difficult for ESS operators to
provide regulation services seamlessly over a relatively long
time period (e.g. several hours). Some system operators have
elected to lower this barrier by co-optimizing energy storage
when dispatching regulation, i.e. taking into account the state
of charge (SoC) and the cycling efficiency of ESS.
This paper compares market policies that affect energy
storage in the frequency regulation market. It covers the ISOs
and RTOs that have organized wholesale electricity markets,
including the PJM Interconnection (PJM); the New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO); the Midcontinent In-
dependent System Operator (MISO); ISO New England (ISO-
NE); California Independent System Operator (CAISO). Study
results on pay-for-performance, fast regulation, and storage
energy compensation are discussed in Section II, Section III,
and Section IV, respectively. Section V analyzes the regulation
payment in different markets. Section VI summarizes the
findings.
II. PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE
All ISO / RTOs in our study have complied with FERC
Order 755 and implemented pay-for-performance in their
regulation markets, except for NYISO and MISO which pay
for regulation capacity only in their day-ahead regulation
markets (DAM). A typical pay-for-performance regulation
market involves the following terms:
TABLE I: Pay-for-performance market terms
Price Regulation Performance
Capacity Mileage mileage factor
PJM capability performance mileage performance
[8], [9] price price score
NYISO capacity movement movement performance
[10] price price index
MISO capacity mileage mileage performance
[11], [12] price price accuracy
ISO-NE capacity service movement performance
[13] price price score
CAISO capacity mileage mileage accuracy
[14] price price percentage
• Regulation capacity (C) is the maximum and minimum
regulation power that a unit offers during a given period.
The regulation capacity is usually symmetrical so that
a unit provides the same positive and negative capacity
(i.e. ±5 MW). With the exception that CAISO separates
regulation into up and down components. The capacity
price in $/MW · h, represents the option price to reserve
1 MW of capacity to provide regulation in the future.
Not to be confused with the exercise price of the energy
required to follow the regulation signal
• Regulation mileage (M ) is the sum of the absolute values
of the regulation control signal movements. The mileage
of a regulation resource output {P1, . . . , Pn} over a time
period with n signal steps and a regulation capacity Pmax
is
M =
n∑
i=1
|Pi − Pi−1|/Pmax (1)
The unit for mileage is ∆MW/MW, representing the
mileage of 1 MW of regulation capacity. The unit for
mileage price is $/∆MW.
• Performance factor (ρ) is a score from 0 to 1 that
indicates a unit’s performance in following the regulation
signal. Most ISO/RTOs model the performance factor
as a unit’s accuracy in signal following (integration of
absolute errors). PJM uses a more complex measure of
performance that involves delay, correlation and accu-
racy [7].
Table I shows the names used for these quantities in each
market.
In a pay-for-performance market, participants offer a capac-
ity price bid and a mileage price bid. The system operator
credits providers of regulation using the market capacity
clearing price (λC ), the mileage clearing price (λM ), and the
performance factor of its unit during the procurement period. A
unit must reach a minimum performance score to be qualified
for receiving credits, and maintain this minimum performance
over a certain period to be eligible to bid into the regulation
market in the future. We generalize the method for awarding
regulation credit (λR) as follows:
λR = C(λC + ρMλM ) (2)
Eq. 2 applies to CAISO and the real-time regulation market in
NYISO. Eq. 2 also applies to MISO when a unit’s performance
is below 70%, a unit receives full credit when above 70%
during each 5-minute performance test interval. At ISO-NE,
the performance factor is used to adjust the capacity payment,
thus Eq. 2 becomes
λ′R = ρC(λC +MλM ) (3)
PJM uses mileage ratio in its credit calculations. The mileage
ratio is the ratio between the mileage of the assigned regulation
signal and the mileage of the traditional regulation signal
(MRegA, see Section III-A). The formula for calculating the
credit becomes
λ′′R = ρC(λC +
M
MRegA
λM ) (4)
III. FAST REGULATION
A fast regulation signal is generated by applying a high-
pass filter to the AGC signal. Such signals have a fast ramping
rate but are designed to have a zero-mean. They are therefore
ideal for ESS interested in providing frequency regulation.
Fast regulations have been implemented by PJM and ISO-NE,
while MISO provides an alternative approach for utilizing fast
responsive units.
A regulation signal’s energy capacity requirement refers to
the minimum energy capacity needed to follow perfectly the
regulation signal, neglecting the efficiency and SoC constraints
of an ESS. The energy requirement of the signal in that hour
is the difference between the maximum and minimum SoC
during the operating hour. For a regulation signal Sh at hour
h with a step size of Ts and N steps per hour, the hourly
energy requirement Eh is therefore
Eh = max
j=1...N
(
j∑
i=1
TsSi
)
− min
j=1...N
(
j∑
i=1
TsSi
)
(5)
The energy balance of a regulation signal is the initial SoC
level that allows a storage with the minimum energy capacity
(Eh) to follow the signal perfectly, ignoring its efficiency and
SoC constraints. A perfectly balanced signal (at 50%) allows
the SoC level of the energy storage to return to its initial level
at the end of the operating period. Since Eq. 5 assumes that
the initial SoC is zero (i.e. it simulates an ESS with negative
capacity), the energy balance σh for the signal Sh is
σh = −
1
Eh
min
j=1...N
(
j∑
i=1
TsSi
)
(6)
A. PJM RegD
PJM provides two regulation signals in its day-ahead regu-
lation market: RegA, is a low-pass filtered ACE designed for
traditional regulation units, while RegD, is a high-pass filtered
ACE designed for fast regulation units [7]. The RegD signal
is controlled to have zero-mean within 15 minutes [15]. Units
can choose freely which signal they follow, but can only follow
one signal at a time. Our analysis of these regulation signals
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Fig. 1: Comparison of PJM and ISO-NE regulation signals.
from June 2013 to May 2014 shows that the mileage of RegA
is about 5 ∆MW/MW per hour, while the mileage of RegD
is around 15 ∆MW/MW per hour, suggesting that RegD
ramps much faster. In market settlements, the mileage ratio for
RegA is therefore 1, and the mileage ratio for RegD is around
3. Section V provides a detailed comparison of regulation
payments. The box plot in Fig. 1a summarizes the distribution
of the hourly energy requirement and shows that in most cases
PJM RegD has an energy requirement of less than 0.25 MWh
or approximately 15 minutes of full charge/discharge. Fig. 1b
shows that RegD has an average energy balance of 50%, but
that the extreme cases can reach 0 and 100%.
B. ISO-NE energy-neutral
ISO-NE includes ESS in the Alternative Technology Reg-
ulating Resources (ATRR), and provides two fast regulation
signals (energy-neutral continuous (ENC), energy-neutral tri-
nary (ENT)), and a conventional regulation signal [16]. A re-
source can change once a month the signal that it follows. ENC
is identical to PJM’s RegD signal, while ENT is specifically
designed for ATRRs and the dispatch is either zero, full charge
power, or full discharge power. Since each trinary dispatched
resource is assumed to have a step response and hence equal
participation factors, the ENT algorithm dispatches the entire
set of Trinary Dispatched ATRRs together. Fig. 1 shows the
energy requirement and the balance analysis using a one-day
duration simulated signal from ISO-NE [17] and suggest that
these signals behave in a similar fashion as PJM’s RegD and
RegA . The mileage difference between the three simulated
signals is not significant: the average mileages being 18, 16,
and 14 ∆MW/MW for ENC, ENT, and the conventional
signal, respectively.
C. MISO AGC-Enhancement
In the MISO reserve market, the deployment interval for
ESS (which are called stored energy resources or SER) is op-
timized for each ESS based on its initial condition [18]. Taking
things one step further, MISO is proposing a new regulation
reserve deployment scheme called AGC-Enhancement [19].
The idea of this scheme is to deploy and un-deploy the fast
ramping units first in the AGC dispatch, by creating a new fast
ramping deployment group. MISO expects AGC-Enhancement
to improve the utilization of fast ramping units.
IV. STORAGE ENERGY OFFSET COMPENSATION
Due to their less than perfect efficiency and the fact that
the AGC signal has a non-zero mean, the SoC of an ESS
is not maintained in the traditional regulation framework.
While the fast frequency regulation alleviates the effect of
the signal energy imbalance, some ISOs have decided to
directly compensate the energy offset of storage units in
their regulation market through dispatching. Such mechanisms
include the Regulation Energy Management (REM) of CAISO,
and the Real-Time Dispatching (RTD) of NYSIO.
A. CAISO REM [20]
CAISO treats ESS as Non-Generating Resources (NGR),
a set of resources that also includes responsive demands.
NGR units have two options for participating in the regulation
market: non-REM (traditional), and REM. Non-REM units
are subjected to the same requirements as traditional regu-
lation units, and must meet the 60-minute continuous energy
requirement (i.e., to provide 1 MW regulation capacity, a non-
REM NGR unit must be able to deliver at least 1 MWh).
The continuous energy requirement for NGR-REM units is 15
minutes. NGR-REM units can only participate in the CAISO
regulation market, and the subscription to REM can only be
changed monthly.
CAISO compensates the energy offset of NGR-REM units.
By participating in REM, a NGR unit submits a preferred SoC
set-point. CAISO will maintain this set-point by dispatching
energy from the Real Time Market (RTM) for the next
real time dispatch interval [21]. This balancing energy is
dispatched to each NGR-REM units together with the AGC
signal by the Energy Management System (EMS). The EMS
also takes into account a unit’s efficiency in the dispatch.
The REM energy compensation is guaranteed during normal
operations, while in emergency cases the SoC is restored later.
In the CAISO regulation market settlement, the regulation
energy charged and discharged from the storage and the
dispatched REM energy are settled at the RTM locational
marginal price (LMP), in addition to the capacity settlement
and mileage settlement. Since REM guarantees to maintain the
SoC of NGRs, the consequence of the energy settlement is that
NGR-REM units must pay for their energy losses at their LMP.
This settlement method is currently unique to CAISO.
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Fig. 2: DAM regulation price comparison (outliers omitted).
B. NYISO RTD [22], [23]
NYISO calls ESS Limited Energy Storage Resources
(LESR). LESR can bid into the regulation DAM and RTM,
but only receive mileage payments in the RTM settlement.
In the day-ahead regulation market, LESR units are evaluated
and scheduled on an hourly basis without considering potential
energy limitations. In the real-time regulation market, the RTD
manages the energy level of LESR to maintain regulation
capability to the extent possible by charging and discharging
the LESR as necessary. The RTD assigns regulation base
points to an LESR every 5 minutes based solely on its SoC
level. For example, at each 5-minute interval, a 20 MW
regulation capacity LESR will provide ±20 MW regulation
reserve at 0 MW base point when its SoC is within a dead-band
centered at 50% SoC. When its SoC is above this dead-band,
it will provide regulation with reduced capacity and a positive
(charging) base point; when its SoC is below this dead-band,
it will provide regulation with reduced capacity and a negative
(charging) base point. Thus the SoC of the LESR converges
to 50%.
As in CAISO, the RTD SoC management is suspended
during emergencies, when it is called RTD-CAM (Corrective
Action Mode). During RTD-CAM, all LESR providing reg-
ulation discharge to zero in order to make up for the loss
of generation. The SoC level is restored after RTD-CAM
terminates.
V. REGULATION MARKET INCOME
A. Day-ahead Market Results
This section compares regulation payments in different
regulation markets using public regulation pricing data from
each ISO/RTO. In pay-for-performance markets, we assume
that the performance factor is an ideal 100%, and use Eqs. 2-
4 to calculate these payments. The box plot in Fig. 2 shows
the distribution of calculated regulation payments in the DAM
for each ISO/RTO.
1) PJM: The payments for the two regulation products
available in PJM are based on signals and market clearing
prices from June 2013 to May 2014. The hourly regulation
mileage for each signal is calculated using Eq. 1.
2) CAISO: CAISO publishes all its historical market data
on the CAISO Open Access Same-Time Information System
(OASIS). Besides pricing data, CAISO also publishes the
hourly reg-up and reg-down mileage data (system mileage
multipliers) of its AGC signal. To be consistent with the
calculations for the other markets, we assume that each unit
offers the same regulation up and regulation down capacity,
we calculate the payments separately using day-ahead market
prices from June 2014 to May 2015, and add the two results
together. The average calculated reg-up price is $5.2/MWh,
while the reg-down price is $4.1/MWh.
3) MISO: MISO publishes ancillary service pricing data on
its market report website [24]. We use the day-ahead ancillary
service market prices from June 2014 to May 2015. This
market does not have a mileage price.
4) ISO-NE: ISO-NE publishes ancillary service pricing
data on its market data and information website [25]. We
use the final hourly clearing price data from June 2014 to
May 2015. ISO-NE started mileage bidding on March 31st,
2015, so the clearing price for April and May contains a capac-
ity price and a service (mileage) price. For these two months,
we use mileage for the simulated ENT signal described in
Section III-B, the payment for the other two signals are not
calculated since the mileages are very close to those for ENT.
5) NYISO: NYISO publishes its ancillary service pricing
data on its pricing data website [26]. We use the DAM
regulation clearing prices from June 2014 to May 2015. This
market does not have a mileage price.
B. Real-time Market
CAISO, MISO, and NYISO have both RTM and DAM for
operating reserves. The RTM is to procure additional reserves
according to real-time system co-optimizations with updated
system conditions [27]. All three markets have mileage pay-
ments, however most mileage clearing prices are very close to
zero and thus have little effect on the final price.
1) CAISO: CAISO determines its RTM regulation capacity
in the hour-ahead scheduling process. The weighted average
RTM price for reg-up and reg-down is $7.84/MWh and
$4.28/MWh, while for the RTM the prices are $6.08/MWh
and $3.98/MWh, respectively [28].
2) MISO: In MISO the RTM is cleared every five minutes
to produce price and dispatch levels for regulation. Its annual
average hourly RTM regulation prices are in general 10% to
15% higher than the DAM prices [29].
3) NYISO: NYISO calculates the RTM requirement over
an RTD interval (1 hour) every 5 minutes. The average DAM
regulation price is $10.1/MWh in 2013 and $12.9/MWh in
2014, while the average RTM regulation price is $9.8/MWh
in 2013 and $13.8/MWh in 2014 [30].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Table II summarizes the findings of our study. In the column
ancillary service (AS) requirements, we list the minimum
energy capacity required to provide 1 MW of regulation
reserve. This requirement is specified for CAISO, while for
PJM and ISO-NE, it is derived from the simulations described
in Section. III. We were not able to find similar information
for MISO and NYISO. The last three columns show the
TABLE II: A Comparison of Regulation Market Policies on Energy Storage and Fast Responsive Units
AS Requirements ES Offset Fast Reg. ES Reg. Cap. Reg. Cost Gen. Avg.
1 MW Cap.(MWh) Control Schemes Abbr. (MW) (M$) (GW)
CAISO [20], [28], [31] 0.25 (REM) 1 (else) REM no NGR ∼ 325 32 ∼ 28
PJM [7], [8], [32] 0.25 (RegD) 1 (RegA) no RegD - 525 − 700 254 ∼ 171
ISO-NE [13], [33], [34] 0.25 (EN) 1 (else) no energy-neutral ATRR 30− 130 29 ∼ 12
MISO [18], [19], [35] - AGC-Enhancement SER ∼ 400 20 ∼ 55
NYISO [22], [30] - RTD no LESR 150 − 250 29 ∼ 18
average required regulation capacity, the regulation cost, and
the average generation capacity in each operator zone.
The comparison shows that PJM operates a very efficient
regulation market in terms of the ratio between regulation
capacity and generation, while the cost of regulation is similar
to the other ISOs relative to the size of the interconnection.
In particular, if we compare the ancillary market cost of PJM
with CAISO, the historical cost of regulation in PJM per MWh
load is ∼$0.2-0.3/MWh, while this cost is ∼$0.1-0.2/MWh for
CAISO. On the other hand, the total per MWh ancillary service
cost is much higher in PJM, at ∼$2/MWh, than in CAISO,
where it is ∼$0.3/MWh [28], [32]. A possible explanation
for this difference is that CAISO performs a co-optimization
of energy and ancillary services, while PJM has a coupled
co-optimization process with more complicated categories of
ancillary services [27]. This latter approach is less efficient
than CAISO’s and results in a higher ancillary service cost. For
example, sometimes the PJM RegD capacity is over-saturated,
meaning that the capacity ratio of RegD is too high. Since the
RegD logic is to maintain a 5-minute zero-mean energy, a high
RegD capacity ratio can make the controller go against ACE
correlation for extreme cases [15].
Our comparison of different markets shows that the reg-
ulation markets are becoming more suitable and profitable
for ESS because the new pay-for-performance policy makes
energy storage more competitive. New zero-mean regulation
policies have lowered the barrier for ESS to provide regulation
for longer periods. From the perspective of a system operator,
the participation of energy storage under appropriate market
designs makes the regulation more efficient. However, provid-
ing a zero-mean regulation signal can be challenging, and must
be well coordinated with other ancillary service products so
that the energy balancing signal does not perturb the system.
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